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Abstract
We investigate whether quantum history theories can be consistent
with Bayesian reasoning and whether such an analysis helps clarify the
interpretation of such theories. First, we summarise and extend recent
work categorising two different approaches to formalising multi-time mea-
surements in quantum theory. The standard approach consists of describ-
ing an ordered series of measurements in terms of history propositions
with non-additive ‘probabilities’. The non-standard approach consists of
defining multi-time measurements to consist of sets of exclusive and ex-
haustive history propositions and recovering the single-time exclusivity
of results when discussing single-time history propositions. We analyse
whether such history propositions can be consistent with Bayes’ rule. We
show that certain class of histories are given a natural Bayesian inter-
pretation, namely the linearly positive histories originally introduced by
Goldstein and Page. Thus we argue that this gives a certain amount of
interpretational clarity to the non-standard approach. We also attempt a
justification of our analysis using Cox’s axioms of probability theory.
Keywords: Bayesian Probability, Consistent Histories, Linear Positivity
PACS: 02.50.Cw, 02.50.Tt, 03.67.-a, 03.65.Ca.
Outline
The basic premise of this paper is rather simple. We propose to apply Bayesian
probability rules to quantum histories theory and see if we get any form of
consistency. The are a few reasons why this is a pedagogically useful tack to
take. Firstly, Bayesian probability is pedagogically useful in its own right as
it provides a framework for thinking about probabilities that is rather natu-
ral in a human sense—it accommodates, in different situations, all uses of the
term ‘probability’ including probabilistic inference and relative frequencies [1].
Secondly, quantum history theories are specifically designed with the idea of
applying such probabilities to closed systems, without necessarily discussing ob-
servers and their experiments; thus it is natural to interpret such probabilities
in a Bayesian manner rather than necessarily discussing the relative frequencies
of experiments. In fact Bayesian probability can accommodate almost all no-
tions of relative frequency presently used in the literature [1], whereas theories
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of relative frequency have to be designed for the problem at hand. Thirdly,
even when discussing quantum histories instrumentally such a Bayesian inter-
pretation might help to clarify the interpretation of Standard Quantum Theory
(SQT) [2]. It will turn out that we can apply a very natural Bayesian interpre-
tation to a certain class of quantum histories. So, although it may seem na¨ıve
at first we will get out something quite profound, a natural interpretation of the
probabilities of certain history propositions. In fact, as we will show, we can
justify our analysis using Cox’s axioms of probability theory [3] to show that
the standard notions of probability in the consistent histories programme aren’t
necessarily ‘good’ notions of probability, but there are alternative notions.
Before we get stuck into our Bayesian analysis, let us briefly discuss why the
foundational interpretation of probability really matters when interpreting such
theories. Then we will introduce quantum history theories and try and analyse
what consistency we can get through Bayesian reasoning.
Quantum Probabilities
In Standard Quantum Theory (SQT) one usually invokes multi-time measure-
ments as a succession of single-time measurements. If we use the von Neumann
measurement formalism then the possible exclusive propositions at each time
are represented by the projection operators associated with the eigenstates of
a Hermitian operator. Thus a non-relativistic history is represented as a suc-
cession of such projection operators each labelled by a time. The probability of
each such history is, in the standard formalism, given by the probability trace
formula. For example, for a three-time succession (t1 < t2 < t3) of von Neumann
measurements {Aˆ(t1), Bˆ(t2), Cˆ(t3)} given an initial state ρ, the probability of a
history {aˆi(t1), bˆj(t2), cˆk(t3)} is given by:
p(ai, bj , ck|ρ) = tr(cˆk(t3)bˆj(t2)aˆi(t1)ρaˆi(t1)bˆj(t2)). (1)
In the above equation the results of each measurement are conveniently
represented by Heisenberg picture projection operators. For example, the results
of the von Neumann measurement Aˆ at time t1 are represented by the set of
Heisenberg picture projection operators aˆi(t1) = U
†(t1 − t0)aˆiU(t1 − t0) where
aˆi are the relevant Schro¨dinger picture operators and t0 is the fiducial time.
Similarly for the other von Neumann measurements Bˆ and Cˆ. This is the
standard way that multi-time measurements are invoked in non-relativistic SQT.
Classically, the additivity of propositions in Bayesian probability theory is
a contextual property of propositions. This can be seen in the pedagogical
example given recently by Mana [2]. Take an urn that contains some red balls
and some wooden balls; the urn is shaken and an observer takes out a ball.
We can ask for the probabilities of the following two propositions: “the ball
is red” and “the ball is wooden”. Only if it is the case that the balls cannot
be both wooden and red then these two propositions are exclusive. Thus, we
can see that propositions are not inherently exclusive. Rather, classically at
least, exclusivity is a contextual property of propositions as there are ways that
these two propositions could be non-exclusive (say, some balls are both red
and wooden). Therefore, since there is no mention of contexts in the standard
analysis, one is not necessarily discussing exclusive propositions when discussing
the possible history propositions that arise through an ordered succession of von
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Neumann measurements. Or, one might, ambiguously, be implicitly invoking
many possible contexts that need to be formally differentiated.
The only way, classically, we have to define whether two propositions A and
B are exclusive is to equate exclusivity with the additivity of their probabilities:
p(A ∪B|I) = p(A|I) + p(B|I) (2)
such that A ∩ B = ∅ where ‘∅’ is the null proposition that is always false in
standard Boolean logic—when A ∩ B = ∅ we say that A and B are disjoint.
So, if two propositions are both additive and disjoint we will simply call them
‘exclusive’ with respect to context I. If this is not satisfied then propositions A
and B are called ‘not-exclusive’ with respect to context I. Classical probability
theory and SQT therefore differ by how they treat ‘not-exclusive’ propositions.
Note that we use the term ‘exclusive’, throughout this paper, in a pedagogically
distinct way to how it is normally used in the quantum histories literature—
where exclusive is synonymous with disjoint. We wish to differentiate ‘disjoint’
and ‘exclusive’ propositions because, classically, exclusive propositions must al-
ways be additive so we wish to reserve the word ‘exclusive’ only for contextually
additive propositions. This means that when we generalise we keep the stan-
dard notion of exclusivity and are forced to name any other tentative notion
something else so as to avoid confusion. In standard Bayesian probability the-
ory exclusive and disjoint are considered equivalent notions (the former being
about probabilities and the latter about the propositions themselves) but when
we get into problems with non-additivity we should differentiate these notions.
Obviously, single-time von Neumann measurements consist of sets of ‘exclusive’
propositions (both additive and disjoint). When we wish to differentiate our
introduced notion of conventional probabilistic exclusivity from other presumed
notions of exclusivity we will do so explicitly, otherwise we will simply use the
term exclusive in the standard contextual probabilistic way we have introduced
above. When we come to discuss quantum history theories it will turn out
that exclusive propositions are also disjoint, but disjoint propositions aren’t
necessarily exclusive (since exclusivity is taken to be a contextual probabilistic
property of propositions whereas disjointness is something that is defined on the
proposition algebra).
Here we use standard Bayesian notation such that all probabilities are de-
fined with respect to a specific context I for exactly the reason noted above:
propositions A and B are only well-defined in a given context exactly because
their meaning is contextual1. By invoking contexts explicitly we hope to clarify
the meaning of such statements. Since the probabilities given by (1) are not
necessarily additive then we are, in the standard interpretation, having to invoke
a different kind of exclusivity to that invoked when requiring both (2) and dis-
jointness. The standard von Neumann interpretation of exclusivity comes about
because each single-time measurement consists of explicitly exclusive proposi-
tions and it is rather natural (although we argue that it is perhaps dubious)
to presume that successions of these single-time measurements give well-defined
exclusive history propositions—even though the non-additivity of the probabil-
ities of such history propositions suggests that they are not probabilistically
‘exclusive’ as we have defined above.
1We use the term ‘context’ in the colloquial manner used by Bayesian theorists rather than
in the technical sense of the Kochen-Specker theorem.
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So, as Anastopoulos has argued [4], there is a dichotomy for multi-time
measurements that we must account for. We have a choice between the two
following paradigms:
1. Postulate single-time exclusivity of results in the standard manner and
presume some na¨ıve kind of exclusivity for multi-time propositions that
arise from a series of single-time measurements. This is the standard
interpretation of von Neumann measurements.
2. Postulate the exclusivity of some history propositions, using the standard
notion of exclusivity of probability theory as we have defined above, and
get single-time exclusivity of results as a corollary by discussing single-time
history propositions.
In what follows we shall refer to these two interpretations as 1 and 2 respec-
tively. Anastopoulos argues, in [4], that neither interpretation of multi-time
measurements have yet been convincingly promoted. We are, of course, used
to interpretation 1 and not used to interpretation 2. If we use interpretation 1
then, as Anastopoulos [4] shows, we are forced to admit a dependency of the
probabilities (treated as relative frequencies) on the resolution of the apparatus
we use, exactly because such ‘probabilities’ are non-additive and thus aren’t ex-
clusive in the conventional sense (nor are they not-exclusive in the conventional
sense). So, if we use finer-grained projection operators we get different proba-
bilities out for given sample sets. It is interesting to investigate interpretation
2 simply because it is not usually considered and cannot be rejected a priori.
It is the conflict implicit in the noted dichotomy which makes us so un-
comfortable with multi-time measurements. In interpretation 1, any ordered
set of measurements, presuming that the relevant apparatus can be made, is
well-defined—this suggests an amazing amount of freedom that nature gives to
experimental physicists.
A Pedagogical Account of Consistent Histories
There does exist a quantum formalism that implicitly uses interpretation 2;
namely the Consistent Histories (CH) programme [5, 6, 7, 8]. Rarely, however,
is interpretation 2 explicitly used by consistent historians. Rather, CH is usually
invoked in a non-instrumental fashion (some exceptions to this trend are [10]
and [11]). Interpretation 2 is also in opposition to the general claim by some
consistent historians that CH solves the measurement problem. Interpretation
2 is a way to re-define measurement rather than solve the measurement problem
per se.
Let us give a brief introduction to the CH programme; the basic setup of
CH is as follows. One defines a set of homogeneous history propositions; follow-
ing [8], each homogeneous history proposition α consists of an ordered tensor
product of time-labelled projection operators just like in SQT—for example:
α := αˆtn(tn)⊗ αˆtn−1(tn−1)⊗ ...αˆt2(t2)⊗ αˆt1(t1) (3)
where each αˆ is a standard single-time projection operator. Here we use the
Heisenberg picture. The ordered set of times over which an homogeneous history
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is defined is called its temporal support. We can then naturally define the class
operator [8] for such a history to be:
Cα := αˆtn(tn)αˆtn−1(tn−1)...αˆt2(t2)αˆt1(t1) (4)
and the probability formula (1) becomes:
p(α|I) = tr(CαρC
†
α). (5)
It is natural to extend the definition of history propositions to include in-
homogeneous history propositions [8]. Inhomogeneous history propositions are
defined by combining homogeneous history propositions in novel, but rather
natural, ways. We will not repeat such arguments here (see Isham’s original
work [8]) because it is sufficient simply to note the following. One can de-
fine ‘or’ and ‘not’ operations for homogeneous history propositions in a rather
natural manner; such operations are denoted ‘∨’ and ‘¬’ respectively. These op-
erations are not the standard notions of ‘or’ and ‘not’ in Boolean logic, but are
defined naturally on the history algebra. The standard ‘and’ operation ‘∧’ takes
homogeneous history propositions into homogeneous history propositions and
behaves exactly like the Boolean ‘and’ operation should. We can also naturally
define a notion of disjointness; we denote such a relation ‘⊥’. Note that we have
explicitly been calling these histories ‘propositions’; this is because, in analogy
with Bayesian probability theory, we are going to treat them as propositions in
the standard sense to see if we get any consistency via Bayesian reasoning.
When two homogeneous history propositions α and β are disjoint (such that
they have the same temporal support) then the class operator for the history
α ∨ β is simply:
Cα∨β = Cα + Cβ . (6)
We define two history propositions to be ‘exclusive’ if their probabilities are
additive under this ‘∨’ operation and such that, in the same context, the prob-
ability of both being the case is zero. A sufficient condition for two disjoint
history propositions to have additive probabilities, and thus be exclusive propo-
sitions, is defined using what is called the decoherence functional d. For SQT
the decoherence functional acting on two homogeneous history propositions α
and β is defined as follows:
dρ,H(α, β) := tr(CαρC
†
β). (7)
There is an ambiguity in how we have defined homogeneous history propo-
sitions because we have used the Heisenberg picture in their definition, but
obviously one could use Schro¨dinger picture projection operators and absorb
all the dynamics into the definition of the decoherence functional. So, the sub-
scripts ρ and H refer to such a dependence of the decoherence functional on
the initial state and the Hamiltonian. We will drop these subscripts from now
on and such dependence is kept implicit. One can consider the initial state and
dynamics constant throughtout the following discussion. Obviously, d(α, α) has
the same form as (1). If we take two homogeneous history propositions αi and
αj then their respective probabilities (d(αi, αi) and d(αj , αj) respectively) are
additive if d(αi, αj) = 0—if this is the case then we will call these two history
propositions ‘exclusive’ with respect to a context I. We call the context ‘I’
simply to give it a name and invoke a context explicitly—we reserve the right
to change its name, or use a different context, later. I obviously must specify ρ
and H , but it may also specify further information at present left unspecified.
A set of such history propositions {αi : i = 1, 2, ..., N} is called ‘d-consistent’ [8]
when all such propositions are mutually ‘exclusive’ and exhaustive with respect
to context I. Single-time SQT is recovered by noting that von Neumann single-
time measurements are d-consistent sets of single-time history propositions. For
two disjoint histories we have that d(αi ∧αj , αi ∧αj) = 0. A set of disjoint his-
tories that form a partition of unity such that
∑
i d(α
i, αi) = 1 is simply called
a ‘complete’ set.
If we use interpretation 2 then it is clear that we could equate multi-time
measurements with d-consistent sets. However, rather than call a d-consistent
set a measurement (which might get quite confusing when discussing the dis-
tinction between interpretations 1 and 2) we will call a d-consistent set a ‘null-
counterfactual’. A null-counterfactual consists of an exclusive and exhaustive
set of propositions. A counterfactual statement is a statement about what would
have happened in a different context; a null-counterfactual statement is simply
the trivial statement about what would happen if the same context was invoked.
Obviously in quantum theory a null-counterfactual can have many different ex-
clusive results because of its probabilistic nature [9]. So a null-counterfactual
is almost like a definition of ‘context’, but we do not wish to use the term
‘context’ because of its more technical use in SQT and because, in what fol-
lows, we use the term in the more colloquial Bayesian manner. If such a von
Neumann measurement is repeated using an identical setup then one of the
possible propositions is, exclusively, the case; so, a standard single von Neu-
mann measurement is a null-counterfactual. The same is considered true for
null-counterfactuals consisting of more general history propositions. A series of
von Neumann measurements does not necessarily define a null-counterfactual.
Null-counterfactuals can also include inhomogeneous history propositions.
Some history propositions cannot be defined in any d-consistent set; such his-
tory propositions are to be called non-d-realisable. A necessary and sufficient
condition for a history proposition αi to be d-realisable is thus:
d(αi, αi) + d(¬αi,¬αi) = 1. (8)
Although it is not yet clear which interpretation which out of 1 or 2 is
physically correct, it is pedagogically interesting to investigate interpretation 2
because it is not usually considered and cannot be rejected a priori [4]. Adopt-
ing 2 is tempting because of its clear and unambiguous definition of exclusivity
and null-counterfactual statements. In interpretation 1 one might run an ex-
periment and a certain history proposition is realised; one may then ask a null-
counterfactual question: “what history propositions could be realised if you
repeated the experiment in exactly the same manner?” and you are forced to
presume that any distinct history proposition that is realised upon a second run
is exclusive to the one you first received even though it is not probabilistically
exclusive in the standard sense. Using null-counterfactuals in interpretation 2
one bypasses this problem (as such a definition of exclusivity is uncontroversial).
Just as we define a single-time measurement to be some kind of context in which
an exclusive set of single-time propositions can be realised, so it seems we might
wish to define a multi-time measurement to be related to contexts in which an
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exclusive set of history propositions can be realised.
Just as von Neumann measurements can be convexly mixed we might assume
that more general null-counterfactuals can be mixed. If we use interpretation
1 then it is clear that a succession of von Neumann measurements might not
be defined by a d-consistent set of homogeneous history propositions, but each
homogeneous history proposition might be d-realisable. In such a case then
perhaps, one might na¨ıvely think, we can define such a multi-time measurement
using interpretation 2 by mixing null-counterfactuals.
Note that in the CH interpretation of quantum systems the values of prob-
abilities of history propositions are independent of the d-consistent set they are
taken to be part of. This is rather analogous to the Gleason non-contextuality
of single-time SQT [12]. It is exactly this type of non-contextuality that has, in
the history of SQT, confused the distinction between interpretations 1 and 2.
This is because the independence of the values of probabilities upon contexts
doesn’t necessarily mean that we can disregard the contextual element of their
very definition. A tautology: probabilities with the same values are not nec-
essarily the same probabilities—they might need to be distinguished. No two
equals are the same.
One can easily imagine a situation where an experimenter mixes a set of von
Neumann measurements such that she chooses each such measurement with
a given weight. In such a case it doesn’t matter that the propositions realised
within different measurements are not considered exclusive when taken together,
they become exclusive only by the application of the mixing process. Similarly
one might be able to give a good definition to a mixture of null-counterfactuals.
So, if we take a succession of von Neumann measurements and label the
possible history propositions as {αi : i = 1, 2..., N} then this set need not be
d-consistent but if all the αi are d-realisable then the sets {αi,¬αi} will be
d-consistent for each i = 1, 2, ..., N . Let us denote p(αi|I) = d(αi, αi) in order
to emphasise the probabilistic interpretation of the decoherence functional. If
we mix these null-counterfactuals we must assign weights wi to each such d-
consistent set {αi,¬αi}, just as we would if we were mixing a set of von Neumann
measurements. Presuming that the context I is the same for each element of
the mixture (we reserve the right to change this assumption later but it is easy
to assume that the proposition αi∨¬αi is equivalent to the proposition αj∨¬αj
since they are normally considered equivalent tautologies, our mixture M being
a weighted set of different tautologies in this case) then the probability for any
history αi to be received given such a mixed set M is given by the following:
p(αi|M) = wip(α
i|I) +
N∑
j 6=i
wjp(α
i ∧ αj |I) +
N∑
j 6=i
wjp(α
i ∧ ¬αj |I). (9)
If we equate p(αi ∧ αj |I) with d(αi ∧ αj , αi ∧ αj) then we must note that
d(αi ∧αj , αi ∧αj) equals zero for all disjoint homogeneous history propositions
αi and αj which are defined over the same temporal support. This is because,
for all such history propositions, αi ∧αj ≡ 0, where 0 is used to denote the null
history proposition. Thus for all homogeneous history propositions so defined
the first summation in (9) is equal to zero.
The simplest case is when all the d-consistent sets {αi,¬αi} are a priori
equally likely; so lets try this and see what happens in the case where wi =
1
N
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for all i—each d-consistent set will be the corresponding null-counterfactual with
a priori weight 1
N
. Note that we don’t yet call such weights ‘probabilities’. In
such a case we get:
p(αi|M) =
1
N
(p(αi|I) +
N∑
j 6=i
p(αi ∧ ¬αj |I)). (10)
Now we must ask what form p(αi ∧ ¬αj |I) should take in terms of the
decoherence functional. It is clear that, by intuition, the history proposition
αi ∧ ¬αj is equivalent to αi. The proposition that the history proposition αi
is the case and the proposition that αj isn’t the case is just equivalent to the
proposition that the history proposition αi is the case. This can be shown
explicitly in the History Projection Operator (HPO) form of CH [8]. In the
HPO formalism homogeneous history propositions are represented by tensor
products of the relevant single-time propositions. So for two two-time history
propositions we have that αi = αˆit1 ⊗ αˆ
i
t2
and αj = αˆjt1 ⊗ αˆ
j
t2
. If we assume that
these two history propositions are defined such that αˆit1 ⊥ αˆ
j
t1
and αˆit2 ⊥ αˆ
j
t2
then the proof that αi ∧ ¬αj = αi goes as follows:
αˆit1 ⊗ αˆ
i
t2
∧ ¬(αˆjt1 ⊗ αˆ
j
t2
) := αˆit1 ∧ ¬αˆ
j
t1
⊗ αˆit2 ∧ ¬αˆ
j
t2
+ αˆit1 ∧ ¬αˆ
j
t1
⊗ αˆit2 ∧ αˆ
j
t2
+ αˆit1 ∧ αˆ
j
t1
⊗ αˆit2 ∧ ¬αˆ
j
t2
(11)
= αˆit1 ⊗ αˆ
j
t2
+ αˆit1 ⊗ 0ˆ+ 0ˆ⊗ αˆ
j
t2
(12)
= αˆit1 ⊗ αˆ
i
t2
. (13)
Eq.(11) represents the intuitive logical result that the history propostion
αi ∧ ¬αj can be true in three different ways, namely if any one of the three
history propositions on the RHS of Eq.(11) is true. To get from Eq.(12) to
Eq.(13) we simply note that all history propositions which have a null result at
any given time are deemed equivalent to the null history 0 = 0ˆ⊗ 0ˆ [8].
Thus, for homogeneous history propositions that are defined using exclusive
and exhaustive single-time propositions, it is always the case that αi∧¬αj = αi
and thus that:
d(αi ∧ ¬αj , αi ∧ ¬αj) = d(αi, αi). (14)
Thus it seems natural to equate p(αi∧¬αj |I) with p(αi|I) = d(αi, αi) in this
case. This gives us that the probability that history proposition αi is the case,
given that context M is an equally weighted mixture of null-counterfactuals, is
given by the rather trivial result:
p(αi|M) =
1
N
(p(αi|I) + p(αi|I)
N∑
j 6=i
1) (15)
=
1
N
(p(αi|I) + (N − 1)p(αi|I)) (16)
= p(αi|I) = d(αi, αi). (17)
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Note that this result does not depend upon the fact that we chose to use
equal weights. Any set of positive weights wi, such that
∑
iwi = 1, would work.
This result should be taken with a pinch of salt, lots of implicit assumptions
have been made in order to reach (17)—we will investigate it less na¨ıvely in the
next section once we have introduced a Bayesian account of such propositions.
So, it is clear that some ordered sets of single-time von Neumann measurements
might equally well be interpreted as a mixed set of null-counterfactuals—but, of
course, not all ordered sets of von Neumann measurements could be interpreted
in such a manner.
Non-d-realisable propositions are propositions that can never be d-realised
with respect to some other history propositions in context I. So far we have
not discussed the strict meaning of the context I; we have simply kept the
context within the notation because of the tentative contextual meaning we
apply to propositions. In [2] it was shown that doing such a thing can help
clarify the meaning of probabilistic statements in SQT; we simply adopt the
same principle here for quantum history theories. So, for the moment, one is
asked just to accept the name ‘I’ for the the context whatever that context is
taken to mean. We will, in part, rectify this gnomic situation later.
So, strictly speaking, the above discussion is rather na¨ıve and we have yet to
check that the reasoning we have used is all consistent and unambiguous. For
example, it is not clear that the context I is well-defined globally throughout the
mixing process. Or whether the mixing process is itself well-defined—especially
since the weights are totally arbitrary. We shall examine this in the following
sections. We will show that by using Bayesian reasoning such concepts do
become consistent and less ambiguous.
Bayesian Histories
Bayes’ rule is a rule that relates a priori probability statements to a posteriori
probability statements. Say we have two propositions A and B and a general
contextD which refers to the general setup of the problem (and remains constant
through the analysis) then Bayes’ rule is as follows:
p(A|BD) =
p(B|AD)p(A|D)
p(B|D)
. (18)
Bayes’ rule is derived from the following rule:
p(A ∩B|D) = p(A|BD)p(B|D) = p(B|AD)p(A|D). (19)
We can try and use Bayes’ rules (or equivalently (19)) to analyse the reason-
ing we used above. If we take all history propositions then one might be tempted
to try and apply Bayes’ rule to them and see if we get any form of consistency.
So, let us apply Bayes’ rule in the following na¨ıve way, simply using the history
algebra ‘∧’ instead of the standard Boolean ‘∩’ (we will justify the step using
Cox’s axioms of probability later):
p(αi ∧ ¬αj |I) = p(αi|¬αjI)p(¬αj |I) (20)
= p(¬αj |αiI)p(αi|I). (21)
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By intuition one might like to assign that p(¬αj |αiI) := 1 because if the
proposition αi is true then obviously the proposition ¬αj is true. This then
gives us that:
p(αi ∧ ¬αj |I) = p(αi|I). (22)
The above analysis is consistent as long as Bayes’ rule is valid for such history
propositions, so we need to work out if Bayes’ rule is a valid way to manipulate
the probabilities of history propositions. For this to be the case then all the
above probabilities must be well-defined. We will justify our na¨ıve application
of Bayes’ rule later, but for now let us continue along with this na¨ıve analysis
for a moment and see how Bayes’ rule (or equivalently rule (19)) apply to the
other probability assignments we might like to make.
p(αi ∧ αj |I) = p(αi|αjI)p(αj |I) = 0 (23)
= p(αj |αiI)p(αj |I) = 0. (24)
The statement (23) is intuitively the case for disjoint history propositions
since if αj is the case then αi isn’t the case, and similarly for the second decom-
position (24). Note that this doesn’t presume that these two propositions are
probabilistically exclusive, only that given one we never infer the other.
p(¬αi ∧ αj |I) = p(¬αi|αjI)p(αj |I) (25)
= p(αj |I). (26)
To get to (26) we use exactly the same reasoning we used to get (22). And
so we come to ask how we interpret p(¬αi ∧ ¬αj |I). One way to look at this
probability is to decompose it as follows:
p(¬αi ∧ ¬αj |I) = p(¬αj |¬αiI)p(¬αi|I) (27)
= (1− p(αj |¬αiI))p(¬αi|I) (28)
= (1−
p(αj |I)
p(¬αi|I)
)p(¬αi|I) (29)
= p(¬αi|I)− p(αj |I). (30)
But, of course, instead of using the decomposition (27) one could have used:
p(¬αi ∧ ¬αj |I) = p(¬αi|¬αjI)p(¬αj |I) (31)
= (1 − p(αi|¬αjI))p(¬αj |I) (32)
= (1 −
p(αi|I)
p(¬αj |I)
)p(¬αj |I) (33)
= p(¬αj |I)− p(αi|I). (34)
In order for the two ways of decomposing p(¬αi∧¬αj |I) to be consistent we
require that p(¬αj |I)−p(αi|I) = p(¬αi|I)−p(αj |I). A necessary and sufficient
condition for the history propositions to satisfy this requirement is that:
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p(αi|I) + p(¬αi|I) = K for all i, (35)
where K is a positive constant. We call condition (35) quasi-realisability. When
K = 1 we call the probabilities realisable. Note that in assuming steps (28)
and (32) are valid we must presume that the probabilities are realisable in an a
posteriori sense in that p(αi|¬αjI) + p(¬αi|¬αjI) = 1 for all i.
A set {αi : i = 1, 2, ..., N} that does not satisfy (35) does not give equal
decompositions (27) and (31). Thus, in interpretation 1 any complete set of
homogeneous history propositions makes sense, but if we require consistency
with Bayesian probability theory then we must at least discuss sets of history
propositions which satisfy the stricter condition (35).
So, if we identify that p(αi|I) = d(αi, αi) and that p(¬αi|I) = d(¬αi,¬αi),
then a sufficient condition for all the above to be consistent by both decomposi-
tions (27) and (31) is that everything is d-realisable. If the history propositions
weren’t d-realisable then there is no a priori reason why decompositions (27)
and (31) should match. However, are all these probabilities well-defined? All
the probabilities that we identify with decoherence probabilities are obviously
well-defined in the sense that they are bounded between 0 and 1. But we haven’t
yet identified whether the na¨ıve conditional probabilities are all well-defined.
For example, if we make the identification that p(¬αj |αiI) = 1 and then,
using Bayes’ rule, we derive:
p(αi|¬αjI) =
p(αi|I)
p(¬αj |I)
=
d(αi, αi)
d(¬αj ,¬αj)
. (36)
In order for the above to be bounded by 0 and 1 we require that:
0 ≤
d(αi, αi)
d(¬αj ,¬αj)
≤ 1. (37)
If αi is more probable than ¬αj in the context I then the above condition
will not be satisfied. The next question we must ask is what types of history
propositions do we require for this Bayesian analysis to be consistent? In terms
of the HPO form of CH [8] we define that the the homogeneous history proposi-
tions {αi : i = 1, 2, ..., N} defined using exclusive sets of single-time propositions
are all mutually disjoint: αi ⊥ αj for all i, j such that i 6= j. In terms of the
natural orthoalgebra of history propositions, this means that αi ≤ ¬αj for all
i, j such that i 6= j. Thus if the decoherence functional preserves the partial
order defined on the history proposition space then condition (37) is satisfied.
Isham and Linden [13] have argued that this need not be the case; there are
examples where the following is not true:
α ≤ β ⇒ d(α, α) ≤ d(β, β). (38)
They give a specific example which disobeys (38). The sum-over-paths for-
mulation for SQT does obey (38) and it is thus not clear whether we should
assume it in general history theories [13]. In order to satisfy (37), however, we
must use sets of history propositions such that the following is satisfied:
αi ≤ ¬αj ⇒ d(αi, αi) ≤ d(¬αj ,¬αj) for all i 6= j. (39)
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Presuming {αi : i = 1, 2, ..., N} consists of d-realisable homogeneous history
propositions that are defined using exclusive and exhaustive single-time propo-
sitions then this Bayesian analysis is consistent as long as (39) is satisfied. If
this is the case then the probabilities p(αi ∨ αj |αkI) and p(αi ∨ αj |¬αkI) are
well-defined (in the sense of being bounded by 0 and 1) for all i, j, k. This can
be seen just by invoking the conditional probabilities invoked above.
p(αi ∨ αj |αkI) := p(αi|αkI) + p(αj |αkI)− p(αi ∧ αj |αkI) (40)
If k 6= i and k 6= j then the RHS of (40) is 0 + 0 − 0 = 0. If k = i 6= j then
the RHS of (40) is 1 + 0 − 0 = 1 and if k = j 6= i then it is 0 + 1 − 0 = 1. If
k = i = j then the RHS is 1 + 1 − 1 = 1. This is all as we would expect by
intuition. Similarly,
p(αi ∨ αj |¬αkI) := p(αi|¬αkI) + p(αj |¬αkI)− p(αi ∧ αj |¬αkI) (41)
is well-defined by construction. We can also define ‘∨’ relations for the inhomo-
geneous negations.
p(αi ∨ ¬αj |αkI) := p(αi|αkI) + p(¬αj |αkI)
−p(αi ∧ ¬αj |αkI). (42)
p(αi ∨ ¬αj |¬αkI) := p(αi|¬αkI) + p(¬αj |¬αkI)
−p(αi ∧ ¬αj |¬αkI). (43)
p(¬αi ∨ ¬αj |αkI) := p(¬αi|αkI) + p(¬αj |αkI)
−p(¬αi ∧ ¬αj |αkI). (44)
p(¬αi ∨ ¬αj |¬αkI) := p(¬αi|¬αkI) + p(¬αj |¬αkI)
−p(¬αi ∧ ¬αj |¬αkI). (45)
All the above, by construction, give answers consistent with classical proba-
bilistic intuition as long as d-realisability and (39) are satisfied. So, if we discuss
exhaustive sets of d-realisable propositions such that:
p(αi|¬αjI) =
p(αi|I)
p(¬αj |I)
≤ 1 for all i, j such that i 6= j, (46)
then we can, by construction, get complete consistency with Bayesian rea-
soning. History propositions αi and αj within such a set are additive over
all conditional probabilities even if they are not additive a priori such that
p(αi ∨ αj |I) 6= p(αi|I) + p(αj |I). But is there anything wrong with two propo-
sitions being additive in one context and not additive in another? Of course
not. In the Bayesian framework, probabilities are always defined contextually
[1] and exclusivity is a contextual property of propositions.
This is not to say that quantum probabilities definitely don’t behave in ways
that go against classical intuition, only that classical Bayesian probability theory
might take us a little further than we may have thought in analysing quantum
history propositions. This approach, which we call Bayesian Histories (BH),
has a clear pedagogical basis and, as we shall argue below, may tentatively be
experimentally distinguishable from SQT.
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So, using BH, we can define history propositions to be exclusive in certain
contexts. But, of course, we can identify these contexts either as a priori ones
or a posteriori ones in reference to Bayes’ rule (18) depending upon what stage
of the Bayesian updating process we are considering.
A Pedagogical Account of Additivity
As we discussed above, and recently emphasised by Mana [2], propositions have
certain properties that are contextual. The exclusivity of propositions is a con-
textual property of propositions. Therefore if we have two propositions A and
B it is not necessarily the case that they are exclusive in any given context (nor
even defined in any given context). We have defined above that the exclusivity of
two propositions arises when p(A∩B|D) = 0 and p(A∪B|D) = p(A|D)+p(B|D)
such that all probabilities are well-defined (this happily coincides with the stan-
dard Bayesian notion of exclusivity). In a similar way, consistent historians
define ‘d-consistency’; although there is a subtle distinction between the two.
In CH contexts are defined to be situations in which d-consistency occurs, where-
as in BH contexts are far more general. The exclusivity of propositions might
be gained when going from a priori probabilities to a posteriori probabilities.
So, for propositions A and B and prior-information D it might be the case that:
p(A ∪B|D) 6= p(A|D) + p(B|D) (47)
even though when we update using further information E it is the case that:
p(A ∪B|ED) = p(A|ED) + p(B|ED). (48)
This is a possibility we can imagine since exclusivity is a contextual property
of propositions. One might be able to define contexts which give additive a
posteriori probabilities using BH, rather than restricting ourselves to additive
a priori probabilities (as one might put it when using CH).
Using Bayes’ rule we can also na¨ıvely derive the following rule:
p(A|(D ∪ E)F ) = p(D ∪ E|AF )
p(A|F )
p(D ∪ E|F )
(49)
=
p(D|AF )p(A|F ) + p(E|AF )p(A|F )
p(D ∪ E|F )
(50)
=
p(D ∩ A|F ) + p(E ∩ A|F )
p(D ∪ E|F )
. (51)
We get to (50) as long D and E are additive on the a posteriori context AF .
Throughout the analysis that gave us (17) we assumed that the context I
is well-defined and globally applicable to each null-counterfactual. This is an
assumption that need not be valid. For example, one could either make the
association that p(αi|C) = d(αi, αi)—identifying the decoherence functional
with a priori probabilities—or one could associate the decoherence functional
with a posteriori probabilities:
p(αi|(αk ∨ ¬αk)C) = p(αi|1kC) = d(αi, αi). (52)
13
Now, if we associate the decoherence functional with a posteriori probabil-
ities then such probabilities are independent of the context 1k in which they
are taken. This is a kind of non-contextuality. Even if the values are the same,
however, they may still behave differently—probabilities with the same value
are not necessarily the same probabilities. Thus we should keep their notational
dependence upon context even if their values are the same. When can one
interpret each 1k as a null-counterfactual? By (51) we have:
p(αi|1kC) =
p(αi ∧ αk|C) + p(αi ∧ ¬αk|C)
p(1k|C)
. (53)
So, if we associate the decoherence functional probabilities with a posteriori
probabilities rather than a priori probabilities then we have that:
p(αi|1kC) = d(αi, αi) =
p(1k|αiC)p(αi|C)
p(1k|C)
. (54)
This means that p(αi|1kC) 6= p(αi|C). So, even if probabilities don’t depend
upon the contexts 1kC, probabilities still depend on whether such a context
is known to be the case or not. A priori probabilities are not the same as
a posteriori probabilities. It is rather natural to make the association that
I = 1kC and hence why we must differentiate between C and I in the above
presentation. We reserve the the name ‘C’ for a priori contexts. Thus all
the na¨ıve probability assignments given in context I can be passed across to
probability assignments in contexts 1kC for all k.
Using (51) we can discuss the probabilities assigned to an exhaustive set of
contexts ∨k1
k:
p(αi|(∨k1
k)C) =
(
∑
k p(α
i ∧ 1k|C))
p(∨k1k|C)
(55)
= p(αi|1kC)
∑
k
p(1k|C) = d(αi, αi). (56)
Therefore, a set of contexts {1k} that are exhaustive on C gives us the
standard probabilities predicted by SQT.
One might now ask how the a priori probabilities behave. We presume
that p(1k|αiC) = 1 for all k since such conditional probability assignments
are natural. Thus we have that ratios of a priori probabilities and ratios of a
posteriori probabilities are equal, for example:
p(αi|C)
p(¬αk|C)
=
p(αi|1kC)
p(¬αk|1kC)
. (57)
In order for the probabilities p(αi∧¬αk |C) to be well-defined we thus require
that such ratios are less than 1. This is thus equivalent to requiring (39). In
order for probabilities p(¬αi ∧¬αk|C) to be consistent with Bayes’ rule we also
require that the a priori probabilities are quasi-realisable:
p(αi|C) + p(¬αi|C) = L for all i (58)
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where L is a constant. Since we are assuming that the a posteriori probabilities
are independent of contexts we require that p(αi|1kC) = p(αi|1iC). We thus
have that p(1i|C) = p(1k|C). This suggests that all contexts 1k are a priori
equally likely so:
p(1i|C) = L′ for all i (59)
where L′ is a constant. Comparing a posteriori and a priori probabilities we
have that:
p(αi|1kC) + p(¬αi|1kC) =
p(αi|C) + p(¬αi|C)
p(1k|C)
=
L
L′
= K for all i. (60)
This is thus completely consistent with our requirement that the a posteriori
probabilities must be quasi-realisable (35). Thus if L
L′
= K = 1 then we have
d-realisable history propositions for all i. If we haveK 6= 1 then we have a quasi-
d-realisable set of history propositions. If L = L′ then we have a very cogent
interpretation: all the contexts that we invoke consist of d-consistent sets and
are thus what we have called null-counterfactuals. So, if L = L′, we represent
experiments using an equally weighted mixture of null-counterfactuals. When
K 6= 1 we don’t have a good interpretation so, for now, we reject such cases.
We have a sound interpretation for a posteriori contexts when K = 1, but
what does the a priori context C refer to? We don’t interpret C here except
to say that if Bayesian probability is the correct probability to use then we
must require that such a priori contexts are consistent with Bayes’ rule (18).
C is simply some context in which the a priori probabilities are well-defined.
C is our knowledge about {1k} and our knowledge about {1k} is that we don’t
know which 1k happens, so we apply equal a priori probabilities. The standard
von Neumann collapse formulation predicts that all probabilities for multi-time
measurements are well-defined, but in BH only those that give consistency with
Bayesian reasoning are valid. Thus the collapse hypothesis is not deemed univer-
sally valid in BH—it is rather only a convenient hypothesis in certain situations.
Lets look at a standard interference device: a Mach-Zehnder interferometer.
In the standard interpretation there are two possible history propositions which
end in detection by a given detector labelled e—these histories we call αu and
αd—and SQT predicts that each one happens with probabilities given by the
decoherence functional: d(αu, αu) and d(αd, αd) respectively. We interpret αu
to be the history proposition that the particle takes the upper path and αd as
the proposition that it takes the lower path. Thus, in the standard interpre-
tation, the probabilities given by the decoherence functional using these two
propositions represent the situation where the path of the particle is measured.
Interference suggests that:
d(αu ∨ αd, αu ∨ αd) 6= d(αd, αd) + d(αu, αu). (61)
This means that, in the standard interpretation, when you don’t measure the
path you predict a different probability at the detector to that you would predict
had you measured the path. One can loosely say then that in one ‘context’ the
histories are exclusive and in another they are not, but how do we formalise such
notions? It is clear that in the space of history propositions it is not the case
that ¬αu = αd. We must be more subtle in our use of the negation operation.
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Using interpretation 2 we look at this path detection experiment in a subtly
distinct fashion. There are two possible null-counterfactuals 1u = αu∨¬αu and
1d = αd ∨ ¬αd (lets presume explicitly that αu and αd are both d-realisable
since we have a good interpretation for such propositions). Using (51) we make
the association:
p(αu|1dC) =
p(αu ∧ αd|C) + p(αu ∧ ¬αd|C)
p(1d|C)
(62)
=
0 + p(αu|¬αdC)p(¬αd|C)
p(1d|C)
=
p(αu|C)
p(1d|C)
. (63)
We can do this as long as the probabilities for αd and ¬αd are well-defined
and additive on the a posteriori context αuC. With similar provisos we can
argue that:
p(αu|1uC) =
p(αu ∧ αu|C) + p(αu ∧ ¬αu|C)
p(1u|C)
(64)
=
p(αu|C)
p(1u|C)
. (65)
When we do the experiment we have no a priori reason to expect one null-
counterfactual to occur over the other so we assign equal weights to each,
p(1u|C) = 1
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= p(1d|C). Each null-counterfactual is deemed to be apt with
these a priori probabilities. So the Mach-Zehnder experiment can consist of an
equally weighed mixed set M of null-counterfactuals such that:
p(αu|M) =
p(αu ∧ 1u|C) + p(αu ∧ 1d|C)
p(1u ∨ 1d|C)
(66)
= d(αu, αu). (67)
Thus we recover the SQT predictions for path detection as long as we use
d-realisable history propositions which give a consistent Bayesian analysis. Oth-
erwise we must use a different set of null-counterfactuals—the same set of null-
counterfactuals can’t give use the the case when path detection doesn’t occur.
We could also try to define the probability p(¬αu|M) and in order to do so we
would require that the probability p(¬αu ∧ ¬αd|C) is well defined, and this re-
quires quasi-realisability. So, for consistency of the reasoning we use we require
at least quasi-realisability for both a priori and a posteriori probabilities—we
require (58) and (35) respectively.
We have investigated the situation where the path lengths are equal but, of
course, one can easily introduce phase shifters into the arms of the interferome-
ter. Note that the dynamics is invoked in the very definition of the decoherence
functional so phase shifters would be represented by a change in the evolution
between to times from standard unitary evolution to one including a change
in phase: d → d′. Obviously this would have no effect for the path detection
experiments but it would have an effect on non-path detection experiments such
that d′(αu ∨ αd, αu ∨ αd) would depend on a phase factor. Note αu ∨ αd = αe
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where αe is the history proposition that the particle is detected by a click in
detector e without any path detection.
All this discussion about null-counterfactuals is perhaps rather controversial;
it is based around mainly notational issues. We have invoked them here, how-
ever, simply in an attempt to distinguish quasi-realisable and realisable histories.
Even if one does not accept this null-counterfactual formalism we hope that you
still take away with you the primary fact that consistency with Bayesian reason-
ing produces a consistency condition; decoherence probabilities must be at least
quasi-realisable and must satisfy (39), and d-realisable histories seem far less
controversial than quasi-d-realisable ones. As to why we should use Bayesian
reasoning in the first place, we shall get onto that in a moment once we have
discussed linear positivity.
Quasi-realisability vs Linear Positivity
Having a rather natural Bayesian interpretation for complete sets of d-realisable
history propositions, let us now discuss quasi-d-realisable history propositions
that satisfy (35). These don’t give a good interpretation so it is tempting just
to reject them, but lets look a little closer at them. Non-d-realisable history
propositions simply satisfy the inequality d(α,¬α) 6= 0. We have that:
Re d(α,¬α) = Re dLP (α)− d(α, α) (68)
where dLP (α) is defined on homogeneous history propositions in a similar man-
ner to the decoherence functional (c.f. Eq.(7)):
dLP (α) := tr(Cαρ). (69)
As long as they are positive the Re dLP (α) behave like probabilities. In the
literature they are called Linear Positive (LP) probabilities and were originally
promoted by Goldstein and Page [14] as a less restrictive alternative to CH
probabilities. Therefore d-realisable history propositions have the property that
LP probabilities and decoherence functional probabilities have the same value.
Quasi-realisability enforces:
pLP (αi|1kC) + pLP (¬αi|1kC) = K ′. (70)
Note, however, that LP probabilities are always, by definition, exhaustive when
defined on a partition of unity
∑
i α
i = 1 so K ′ = 1 for all LP probabilities. So
now we have a choice: either we attempt to interpret quasi-d-realisable propo-
sitions or we extend our discussion to LP propositions. There are a couple
of reasons why going the LP way is pedagogically interesting. Firstly, all LP
probabilities are realisable—hence we don’t need to worry about non-realisable
probabilities cropping up and having to interpret them. We shall give another
reason why we reject non-realisable propositions when we discuss Cox’s axioms.
Secondly, LP probabilities are explicitly non-contextual; their interpretation
doesn’t depend upon what other history propositions they are invoked with.
This makes the non-contextuality assumption a bit more explicit such that LP
probabilities do not depend upon which null-counterfactuals they are defined
with respect to. So we can, rather naturally, define:
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pLP (αi|1kC) = pLP (αi|1iC) for all k, (71)
i.e. its value is independent of the context, labelled by k, we use. It still depends
on the fact that we have a well-defined context hence we keep the notational
dependence upon context and don’t remove it entirely. Even if one represents
non-contextuality by assuming the contexts are all equivalent and called, say, I,
then one still gets a consistency condition, namely quasi-realisability, that LP
probabilities satisfy since they are realisable. This non-contextuality assump-
tion is rather analogous to the Gleason non-contextuality (which can also be
expressed in terms of null-counterfactuals); afterall, what is non-contextuality if
not an assumption that, if you don’t know which null-counterfactual you are dis-
cussing, that you give each possible null-counterfactual equal a priori weighting.
So, there may exist a theorem akin to Gleason’s which shows our LP probability
assignments to be uniquely defined by certain natural assumptions (although
we would have to justify the LP set of history propositions before discussing
such a theorem; we do not attempt such a thing here).
So LP probabilities can then be interpreted in a way that is exactly analogous
to the way we interpreted the complete sets of d-realisable history propositions.
In order for the Bayesian probability assignments to be well-defined probabilities
bounded by 0 and 1 then we must, in analogy with (39), require that all LP
probabilities preserve the partial order on the history space for all LP history
propositions:
αi ≤ ¬αj ⇒ Re dLP (αi) ≤ Re dLP (¬αj) for all i 6= j. (72)
This is satisfied for all LP history propositions.
We can define K ′ = L
′′
L′′′
in an analogous way such that:
pLP (αi|C) + pLP (¬αi|C) = L′′ for all i (73)
and
pLP (1k|C) = L′′′ for all k. (74)
For LP history propositions we have that K ′ = 1 and thus that L′′ =
L′′′. Thus we interpret the a priori context C to be the knowledge that we
have no knowledge about the contexts 1k and thus assign them equal a priori
probabilities. Thus we can, if we wish, extend BH to include all LP history
propositions and not just d-realisable propositions (which are, of course, also
LP).
If BH is correct then it helps, in part, to ‘explain’ interference because the
probabilities invoked obey rules that are consistent with our classical intuition.
If BH is incorrect—if non-LP history propositions remain well-defined and ex-
perimentally realisable—then we have a theory that obeys our classical intuition,
to some extent at least, which SQT disobeys—this in itself would be a novel
result.
Why Bayes’ Rule?
Having shown that there is a certain amount of consistency between Bayes’
rule and the LP formalism the following programme presents itself: perhaps
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we can derive the LP probabilities by taking the history algebra and applying
something akin to Cox’s axioms [3] to this space. Cox’s work derives probability
theory over an underlying Boolean algebra using simple consistency conditions
that a natural form of inductive reasoning should obey, so it seems natural just
to try and apply a similar kind of reasoning with the history algebra. If such
a proof is found and as long as the history algebra could then be justified by a
priori means—or by simple physically justified axioms—then one would be able
to prove that the LP formalism is just another kind of probability theory.
It is clear, however, that our na¨ıve assumption of using Bayes’ rule is justified
by Cox’s axioms. Cox’s first axiom is that the probability of a statement con-
ditional upon some hypothesis determines the negation of that same statement
upon the same hypothesis. The second axiom, more relvent here, is that the
probability that two statements are both true upon a given hypothesis is deter-
mined alone from the probability of one of the statements conditional upon the
given hypothesis and the probability of the other statement conditional upon
the hypothesis conjoined with the presumption that the first statement is true.
In our notation this is written schematically as:
p(α ∧ β|I) := F [p(β|I), p(α|βI)] (75)
where F is an arbitrary function to be determined that is sufficiently well-
behaved for our purposes.
The underlying algebra for history propositions is associative so the following
statement is true:
α ∧ (β ∧ γ) = (α ∧ β) ∧ γ = α ∧ β ∧ γ. (76)
The above property (76) forces F not to be arbitrary and Cox [3] proves that
Bayes’ rule is a consequence (Jaynes highlights a more general proof in [1]):
p(α|βI) =
p(α ∧ β|I)
p(β|I)
. (77)
Since the associativity of ‘∧’ (76) is valid for our quantum logics then Bayes’
rule follows and the above work is justified to an extent. Note that for homoge-
neous histories defined over the same temporal support we have that α∧β = β∧α
so the histories equivalent of the multiplication rule (19) also follows in such
cases.
Thus, although the above analysis initially seems quite na¨ıve there is some
truth to it—Bayes’ rule, if nothing else, should be obeyed by any natural notion
of probability by Cox’s axioms. We have, however, yet to generalise Cox’s
other proofs to the HPO algebra of history propositions proper. This remains
work in progress. It is clear that the decoherence probabilities (which are also
the standard probability assignments invoked using von Neumann collapse), at
least in the Hamiltonian formulation, need not always obey Bayes’ rule—they
can disobey (37) for example and need not be realisable or quasi-realisable—so
we have to restrict our attention to either d-realisable histories or LP ones (or
use some other assignment).
A na¨ıve application of Cox’s first axiom,
p(¬α|I) := G[p(α|I)], (78)
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suggests we should use a fixed value of K, hence why we have restricted our
attention to realisable histories. Hence we should use realisable probabilities
that obey Bayes’ rule—we should use LP probabilities. This approach may
not be considered wholly satisfactory because we are not giving probability
assignments to all histories but only the LP subset of the algebra. This is
curiously analogous to the situation in Youssef’s work [18] where, in deriving
a form of SQT as an ‘exotic’ complex probability theory, he has to presume a
subset where the standard real probabilities are manifested. We have placed
the term ‘exotic’ in scare quotes because we prefer not to use the term. When
invoking Bayesian reasoning there is no a priori reason probabilities should be
real numbers (also see [19]). We only need to presume they are real when notions
of relative frequency are applicable. Hence we would rather call such theories
just probability theories; there is nothing really ‘exotic’ about them. Hence we
leave open the possibility of deriving the whole of the histories formalism in
such a manner. We investigate such a possibility in forthcoming work.
Experimental Differentiation
So if we re-define multi-time measurements to be equally weighted sets of null-
counterfactuals (due to some principle of insufficient reason) we can get all
Linearly Positive (LP) probabilities. One might wish to take this very seriously.
There are two tacks that we can take in regards to BH. Firstly, we could choose
to use BH to discuss closed quantum systems. LP probabilities were originally
promoted in this manner [14] because as soon as we discuss closed quantum
systems then using Eq.(7) to assign probabilities to history propositions simply
becomes a postulate. Using the real part of Eq.(69) to assign candidate prob-
abilities is another, equally valid, postulate. And, of course, any rule that is
distinct from the von Neumann projection postulate must be investigated very
carefully. Dio´si [15] has argued that the LP probabilities should not be used
as probability assignments because they are not consistent with the statistical
independence of subsystems. Implicit in this critique is the use of a relative
frequency interpretation of probability but it is not clear that using a relative
frequency interpretation for closed systems is wholly sound. The only other
option we have (propensities being simply objectivised relative frequencies) is
to use Bayesian probabilities; and if we do use Bayesian probabilities then LP
probabilities are promoted over decoherence probabilities as they have a very
simply interpretation and obey Cox’s axioms for the LP subset. Bayesian prob-
ability theory encompasses the use of relative frequencies in certain situations
[1] so there is nothing necessarily untoward about this.
Secondly, we could try and apply BH to actual experiments. Anastopoulos
suggests, in [4], that we should try and experimentally check that d-inconsistent
sets do really make good statistical sense. With a similar emphasis it may also
be prudent just to check whether non-LP history propositions do really make
good statistical sense in quantum experiments. But, of course, what do we
mean by “good statistical sense”? If we assume that “good statistical sense”
is equivalent with the statement “is consistent with Bayes’ rule” then BH is
promoted as a tautology. Otherwise one must use a form of statistics that is
inconsistent with Bayes’ rule and is also well-defined.
So, it is clear that, at present, the only way we know how to get relative
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frequencies out from quantum history theories is by discussing d-consistent sets.
Those sets that aren’t d-consistent may not give well-defined notions of relative
frequency [4]. This might be because such relative frequencies aren’t convergent
or converge to many different values [16]. Of course, if relative frequencies
converge to many values then the most natural interpretation is to suggest that
we are inadvertently or necessarily mixing contexts. Hence we should, as argued
above, be very careful about the notation we use and include any contextual
dependence in the very definition of the probabilities involved.
Hartle [10], for example, has recently analysed the double slit experiment in
reference to LP history propositions and shows that if the resolution of the screen
is sufficiently high then the candidate probabilities predicted using the real
part of Eq.(69) will not be well-defined. But resolution coarser than a critical
value will give well-defined LP probabilities. How seriously should we take this?
Normally such probabilities are interpreted in closed systems but should we not
just check that these aren’t compatible with the relative frequencies of actual
experiments? We have argued that LP probabilities can be interpreted in a
particularly Bayesian way; the next challenge for BH is thus to try and work
out how such Bayesian probabilities are related (obviously such a relation might
be non-trivial) to the relative frequencies of experiments—as this might provide
a way to experimentally distinguish the two approaches. There are a variety of
ways one can derive relative frequencies from Bayesian probabilities; for example
one can invoke notions of exchangability, independence or use maximum entropy
methods [1]. Statistical independence in history theories has been studied by
Dio´si [15] and discussed by Hartle [10] but there may be other useful ways to
invoke relative frequencies from Bayesian probabilities.
To the present author, it is tempting to believe in BH simply for the cogency
of the interpretation. It uses standard notions of Bayesian probability that are
well understood and it pedagogically invokes the contextuality implicit in the
propositional nature of history propositions. Although, of course, further inves-
tigation and statistical analysis of experiments are necessary to justify it above
the standard interpretation. In the standard interpretation any ordered set of
single-time measurements is realisable regardless of problems of non-additivity
(presuming the relevant apparatus can be made). In BH, only those multi-time
measurements that give well-defined a posteriori and a priori probabilities are
experimentally realisable with good statistics. Thus the standard interpretation
and BH give distinct statistical predictions when interpreted instrumentally.
But, of course, the instrumental validity of BH bares little relation to whether
BH should be invoked when discussing closed quantum systems. In closed sys-
tems probability is implicitly used as a form of inference rather than as relative
frequencies of experiments so one should naturally use Bayesian probability.
We have shown that all LP probabilities are consistent with Bayesian reason-
ing, whereas not all probabilities of the form (1) are (when using the natural
space of history propositions).
Entropy
By invoking contexts in which history propositions are exclusive and exhaus-
tive we now have the opportunity to use standard Shannon entropy to quantify
information. For example, if a set {αi : i = 1, 2, ..., Nα} is exclusive and exhaus-
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tive on a priori context C then we can define the the set’s Shannon entropy
in a simple way. Here we denote probabilities with a small p and probability
distributions with a large P . The Shannon entropy is then simply given by:
H [P (αi|C)] := −KH
Nα∑
i=1
p(αi|C) ln p(αi|C). (79)
where KH is a constant. We cannot define such an entropy for sets {αi} that
aren’t exhaustive and exclusive on C. But we can define an entropy for them if
we take an a posteriori context I in which {αi} are exclusive and exhaustive:
H [P (αi|I)] = −KH
Nα∑
i=1
p(αi|I) ln p(αi|I). (80)
In [2], Mana has cogently argued against improper use of such entropy con-
cepts in SQT. Since we have used standard Bayesian probability and kept con-
textuality in check we can use Mana’s pedagogical results in the histories domain
as well. As such, if we have two sets of propositions {αi} and {βj} that are
exclusive and exhaustive in the same context I—they are both ‘sets of alterna-
tives’ in I—then we can define the conditional entropy as follows:
H [P (βj |αiI)] := −KH
Nα∑
i=1
p(αi|I)H [P (βj |αiI)] (81)
= −KH
Nα∑
i=1
p(αi|I)
Nβ∑
j=1
p(βj |αiI) ln p(βj |αiI). (82)
An analogous definition is used forH [P (αi|βjI)]. In such a case the following
standard formulae should apply by mathematical necessity [2]:
H [P (αi ∧ βj |I)] = H [P (αi|I)] +H [P (βj |αiI)] (83)
= H [P (βj |I)] +H [P (αi|βjI)] (84)
H [P (βj |I)] ≥ H [P (βj |αiI)]. (85)
These are the standard strong additivity and concavity properties of Shan-
non entropy. We can avoid any of the confusions highlighted by Mana [2] by
using such standard definitions of Shannon entropy.
If we interpret multi-time measurements as equally weighed mixed sets of
null-counterfactuals then such entropy concepts allow us to compare d-consistent
or LP sets entropically. This is not particularly useful if one interprets history
propositions in the standard quantum cosmological manner but, of course, it
may be very useful when interpreting quantum history propositions instrumen-
tally. The reader is also referred, in earnest, to a Bayesian derivation of entropic
concepts given recently by Caticha [17].
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Future Research
Isham’s seminal work on CH and topos theory [20] pre-empts the idea that d-
inconsistent sets can be assigned a certain amount of meaning using a notion of
d-accessability which is related to our definition of d-realisability2. The present
work can be considered a pedagogical account of such toposophic concepts in
the domain of instrumental quantum theory, which shows that such a gener-
alisation provides different statistical predictions. Isham also argued that it
is pedagogically useful to discuss d-consistent Boolean algebras rather than d-
consistent sets per se because such objects are more akin to what we think of in
classical probability theory. We agree with this sentiment (although we didn’t
submit to it here because of the useful illustrative notion of null-counterfactual)
and the above work can easily be framed as such: one can define Boolean sub-
algebras W that consist of history propositions; W = {αi : i = 1, 2, ....,M} to
be d-consistent if [20]:
d(αi ∧ αj , αi ∧ αj) = d(αi, αj) for all αi, αj ∈W. (86)
Furthermore, in our notation, we can ask that:
p(αi ∨ αj |I) = p(αi|I) + p(αj |I)− p(αi ∧ αj |I) for all αi, αj ∈ W. (87)
The extended definition of entropy for not-necessarily exclusive events given
by Cox [3] can also be applied to such propositions in a Boolean algebra as long
as (87) is satisfied—when such propositions are not-exclusive they would be
not-exclusive in the same way that classical propositions can be not-exclusive.
It might also be pedagogically useful to generalise single-time von Neumann
null-counterfactuals to Boolean algebras proper. One can discuss more general
contexts in which d-inconsistent Boolean algebras are consistent—in an a poste-
riori sense—with rules (18) and (19). The present author is not yet sure exactly
how such toposophic concepts are related to BH; this is left for further research.
Nor is it clear how such concepts pass across to LP history propositions.
Operational notions [21, 22] such as Positive Operator Valued Measures
(POVMs) provide a generalisation of von Neumann single-time measurements
in the sense that each POVM defines a set of propositions that are apt in a mea-
surement with certain probabilities. As such, it is easy to imagine a operational
generalisation of the above work (see [23, 24]). In the POVM formalism single-
time propositions are represented by effect operators that need not necessarily
be orthogonal. When discussing such operational notions it is important to dis-
tinguish between ‘orthogonal’ propositions and ‘exclusive’ ones—POVMs can
consist of non-orthogonal propositions but these propositions are interpreted
to occur exclusively regardless of whether they are orthogonal or not. In SQT
we can prepare a mixed state of non-orthogonal pure states such that each
pure state occurs exclusively in the mixed state with a given weight; similarly
POVMs can consist of exclusive non-orthogonal propositions. So, if we interpret
the outcomes of POVMs to happen exclusively, a generalisation into the multi-
time domain that is compatible with interpretation 2 might be possible. Such
a multi-time generalisation, however, would require a logic to the set of effect
2Note that our use of the term ‘d-realisable’ in not the same as its use in [20].
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operators akin to the quantum logic of projection operators. Time evolution in
the POVM formalism is more general than unitary evolution which might add
an extra complication.
One is also tempted to apply such null-counterfactuals to Bell-like experi-
ments. It is exactly a cogent notion of a null-counterfactuals that is lacking in
such analyses [25]. By describing such experiments in terms of realisable sets of
history propositions one might nullify any proofs of nonlocality. We have shown
above that there is no a priori reason why all multi-time candidate propositions
made out of single-time propositions should be well-defined consistently. Simi-
larly, there is no a priori reason why candidate null-counterfactual propositions
about multiple spacelike separated spacetime regions must all be well-defined
(as is implicitly assumed in [26] and criticised by [25]). By using interpreta-
tion 2, null-counterfactual statements might necessarily be statements about
both spacelike separated regions and cannot be well-defined for individual small
spacetime regions. This would, tentatively, be a way to argue against the EPR
paper [27] in a way akin to Bohr’s response [28]. It may also be a way to pro-
mote Bayesian probability over relative frequencies [29, 30]. This is presently
left for further research; as are relativistic generalisations of BH.
Conclusions
We have shown that the two interpretations of multi-time measurements given
by Anastopoulos [4] can be distinguished by how they treat non-realisable his-
tory propositions. If we assume that multi-time measurements consist of suc-
cessions of single-time measurements then one gets non-additive (and thus non-
exclusive) propositions—this is the standard interpretation of multi-time mea-
surements. Alternatively, if we assume that multi-time measurements are made
up of sets of exclusive and exhaustive history propositions (and recover single-
time SQT when using single-time history propositions) then one promotes a
more standard notion of probabilistic exclusivity. The latter interpretation
seems cogent and it might be experimentally differentiated from the former
by a statistical analysis of non-realisable propositions in experiments. If the
probabilities of non-realisable propositions all remain well-defined then we must
stick to the standard interpretation, but otherwise the latter novel interpretation
would be promoted. Since the latter interpretation provides a certain amount of
philosophical clarity over the former, it is worthwhile trying to experimentally
distinguish the two. We justify our novel approach, in part, by invoking Cox’s
probability axioms on the history algebra and showing that Bayes’ rule should
be obeyed by any natural probability assignments.
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